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transfers among uses and places of use. This reflects water's crucial role in economic development of the arid West. As water becomes increasingly short, these restrictions could hinder efficient water use (Huffman; Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw; Butcher, Wandschneider, and Whittlesey).
Interest in water markets has recently increased (e.g., Anderson; Whittlesey and Houston; Saliba and Bush; Wong and Eheart; Gardner and Miller; Houston and Whittlesey; Butcher, Wanderschneider, and Whittlesey) reflecting growing pressures on limited water supplies, realization that institutional change will be needed to improve water use efficiency, and the shift toward privatization and market mechanisms to address resource allocation problems. Gardner argues that water markets could promote water use flexibility, establish a recognized water value, and thus provide incentives for more efficient water use. The majority of existing water market literature deals with transactions among agricultural users or between agriculture and urban uses. The following research supports this literature by focusing on transactions between irrigation and instream hydropower users.
Effects of Snake River Flow on Hydropower Generation
Figure 1, based on data from Hamilton and Lyman, shows that 1928 to 1978 average annual Snake River flow in south central Idaho (corrected to 1980 levels of irrigation diversions) varied from 7,178 to 16,701 cubic feet per second (cfs). Idaho depends heavily on hydropower, and the thermal component of electricity supply is quite constant, so potential Idaho electricity supply closely parallels river flow. Power customers place a great premium on supply reliability. A utility can sell only power that is reliably available ("firm") even in the lowest flow years at the high prices paid by firm load customers unless it is willing to risk having to meet a firm load commitment with potentially expensive purchases from surplus power markets. Unreliable power supplies, produced with stream flows above the minimum historical level, cannot be sold as firm, and thus bring lower prices. The intent of an interruptible water market would be to make more water available for power generation in low flow years and thus increase firm power supplies in all years. Table 1 , based on streamflow records from 1928 to 1978, shows the probability and magnitude of interruption that would be needed to maintain upper Snake River flows at selected levels. Relying on a water market to augment streamflow for power generation would, for example, require that 112,425 acre-feet (AF) of water be available in the driest years to boost annual average flows from 7,178 cfs (the lowest flow of record) to an assured average flow of 7,333 cfs. Similarly, 625,715 acre-feet would be required to assure an annual average flow of 8,042 cfs.1 Maintaining average flow at 7,333 cfs would require water to be diverted out of agriculture in only 2% of years.
The example used in this study assumes that a market is used to assure an 8,042 cfs flow. This would require interruption of irrigation deliveries in 19.6% of years. Not all of the 625,715 acre-feet that must be under long-term contract to assure an 8,042 cfs flow rate would be needed in each interruption year because of variations in the severity of water shortage. All contract water would be required in only one year out of fifty-one, 82.0% would be required in another year, 70.5% in a third, and so on with lesser deliveries needed in seven other interruption years. Some flow augmentation would be needed in ten years out of fifty-one, but the long-term average would be only 8.3% of the total volume of contract water. In figure 1 the shaded areas represent the amount of required water delivery to assure average annual streamflows of 8,042 cfs.
The electricity that market water could generate is determined by its contribution to the head developed at hydroelectric dams. The water used to change nonfirm to firm power is represented by the unshaded areas between the two horizontal lines in figure 1. Table 1 suinmarizes the relationships among interruption probability, required contract size, and hydropower value. The expected annual value per acre-foot of water under longterm contract to Idaho Power ranges from $37.09 at 2% expected interruption to $40.98 at 25.5%. Only a small amount of water would actually be delivered at the 2% interruption level, so the value per acre-foot delivered would be extremely high-$1,892. Since expected delivery volume increases faster than expected annual contract value, value per acre-foot of delivered water drops to $473 at the 19.6% interruption level for the interruptible water market illustrated in this study. Additional power generation and value would accrue at federal dams on the lower Snake and Columbia downstream from Idaho Power facilities. While downstream benefits could be significant, this study has focused only on water market impacts within Idaho.
Models of Farmer Response to Interruptible Water Markets
An interruptible Idaho water market could result in substantial hydropower benefits. However, markets need willing buyers and willing sellers, so assessment of whether an inter-2 Avoided costs are the future conventional thermal generation costs avoided if a utility acquires power from sources such as conservation, cogeneration, small hydropower, or a water market. Because the upper Snake basin is already fully appropriated and favorably situated dam sites have either been developed or blocked by environmental concerns, further development of conventional hydropower is unlikely. ruptible water market is feasible requires estimates of its likely impact on farmers. This study estimated the crop income loss that a farmer could expect from leasing water through such a market, which indicates the payment needed to induce farmers to participate.
Seven representative farm models were developed to simulate the responses of southern Idaho farmers using surface water to reduced supplies. Each farm model represents a group of farms with similar water application system, crop mix, pump lift, and location. The models simulate how farmers optimize water use by balancing enterprise profitability against cost of improving water use efficiency. As water availability is reduced, water use efficiency increases, consumptive use and yields decrease, and eventually irrigated crop acreage is reduced. Income losses for each representative farm in years of interruption serve as estimates of the minimum compensation required to induce participation in a water market.
Agriculture currently diverts much more Snake River water than it consumes. Diversions are sometimes as much as 10 to 15 acrefeet per acre. Crop consumptive use in most of this area averages less than 2 acre-feet per acre. The rest of the diverted water becomes runoff, percolates to an aquifer, or returns to the river through a canal system. Since most excess diversion eventually returns to the river, changes in excess diversions could affect only the timing and spatial distribution of stream flow if no change in consumptive use is imposed. In contrast, diversion changes that actually result in less crop consumptive use will leave more water for instream uses, hydropower in particular. This study focuses on changes in consumptive use by manipulation of irrigation diversions of surface water.3
Linear programming is used here to model expected irrigator response in years of water shortage and estimate cost to farmers from participation in an interruptible water market. As water supply is decreased in any given year, the farmer can respond in several ways.
Crop mix can be changed within limits, amount of water applied to crops can be adjusted, irrigation efficiency can be increased by better irrigation management, and land can be left idle. The possible adjustments depend on cropping pattern, irrigation system, and the level of irrigation management and irrigation efficiency. Farms with abundant and inexpensive water supplies often substitute water use for labor, management, or irrigation system investment. Such farms will have more options for adjusting to water shortage than a farm employing a high lift, center pivot system that entails high energy costs. The latter have already made many of the potential adjustments, and as water supply is reduced may have few additional alternatives.
This analysis requires that production response to changing water supply be simulated accurately, but it is beyond the scope of this project to develop a detailed multiperiod crop irrigation simulator to optimize the application of water over an irrigation season. Work by Bernardo and Whittlesey used the SPAW-IRRIG simulator to develop sets of alternative activities for irrigating different crops with varying water supplies and given irrigation systems in Washington's Columbia Basin. The similarity between irrigation in Washington and Idaho allows these Washington irrigation activities to be used as a basis for specifying the tradeoffs expected when water supply for irrigating crops in southern Idaho is varied. About thirty activities per crop, forming an envelope of water use efficiency at alternative water supply levels, were used to represent this tradeoff. As water becomes limiting, it is practical to devote more management and labor to more frequent, smaller water applications in order to increase irrigation efficiency.
The only practical method of controlling the consumptive use of water by a farm is through the control of water delivered to the farm. Hence, each farm model was solved for a wide range of water supply levels to observe the associated water consumptive use for each level of delivered water. This functional relationship was then used to affect the desired level of consumptive use for each farm by controlling the level of delivered water.
An example of alternative management options for a southeast Idaho rill irrigated spring grain operation is shown in table 2. The first column shows four levels of spring grain irrigation, specified by acre-inches of consumptive use. To achieve each level of consumptive use, alternative combinations of irrigation efficiency, applied water, crop yields, labor use, and total variable production costs could be used, as shown in the remaining columns of the table. Variable production costs were adjusted to account for that part of fertilizer and harvest costs that is proportionate to yield. Similar alternative irrigation activities were developed for each crop and irrigation system and incorporated into linear programming models of each representative farm. In response to changes in delivered water quantity, each model selects the combination of labor, management, and energy inputs that gives optimal changes in irrigation efficiency, consumptive water use, and crop acreage, conditioned on energy prices, labor costs, crop prices, and prevailing irrigation technology. Table 3 gives the cropping pattern and the acreage represented by each of the seven farm models used in this analysis. Two rill irrigated farms with no pump lift represent the majority of all surface water-irrigated land in southeast and south central Idaho. Two farms with sideroll sprinklers and canal water delivery represent the remaining southeast Idaho land irrigated using surface water. For south central Idaho two farm models use sideroll sprinklers, one with no pump lift and another requiring 200 feet of pump lift, and a representative farm with 500 foot pump lift uses center pivot sprinklers. These lifts are in addition to pumping required for sprinkler pressurization.
Specifying crops for the representative farms requires aggregation. Barley is used to represent spring wheat and other springseeded small grains. Potatoes are used to represent high-value cash crops including sugarbeets. Beans represent corn grain as a cash row crop of intermediate value. Budget information for each crop is based on crop budgets available from the University of Idaho Extension Service. It is assumed that short-run changes in water supply would not stimulate changes in irrigation systems or affect fixed costs of farm operation, so only variable costs of production are considered. Net returns to irrigated farming are calculated as return to all fixed resources including land, management, machinery, and irrigation system costs. Production costs, water requirements, crop yields, and prices represent 1986 levels.
Upper and lower bounds are used to constrain the adjustment of crop acreage to changing water supplies. This study assumes that the proposed interruptible water market is based on perfect knowledge of the water supply each year prior to spring planting time (presumably based on spring forecasts of basin water yield). Hence, the acreage of a springplanted crop could be reduced to zero. All spring-planted crops except for potatoes are allowed no more than a 20% acreage increase above baseline levels, reflecting market, rotation, and technological constraints. Alfalfa and rotation pasture have an assumed fiveyear life after establishment, so one-fifth of total acreage could be allowed to die for lack of water without affecting long-run rotational patterns and costs of production. Thus, the model limited alfalfa and pasture acreage reductions to 20% of base acreage. The acreage of these crops cannot be increased in the short run. Winter wheat is planted in the fall, prior to availability of water supply projections for the next year; thus, acreage cannot be changed in response to water supply, but the amount of water applied can be adjusted. With perfect knowledge of water supply, farmers can distribute water over the season in any way desired. In very dry years when water supplies would be interrupted, available upstream storage capacity should be sufficient to allow optimal timing of water applications to produce maximum farm income from the available water.
Water markets are likely to be unacceptable politically if they could completely eliminate irrigation in a region in water-short years because of severe disruptions to the local economy. Hence, this study assumes that farmers can contract no more than half their water supply through the market. In the eight interruption years out of fifty-one, required reductions would vary from 10% to 50% of normal water supply. Actually, the data in table 1 show that interruptions would be required in ten years out of fifty-one in order to maintain minimum average flows of 8,042 cfs, but the amount of water required in two years would be too small to justify the transactions costs. Annual consumptive use on southern Idaho farms is 18 to 20 inches per acre. A 50% reduction in consumptive use would require giving up about 9 acre-inches of water per acre. The 625,000 acre-feet of water needed for the market underlying this analysis requires participation by farms with over 800,000 irrigated acres-about 60% of the acreage irrigated with surface water in the study region.
Representative Farm Model Results
Representative farm baseline results appear in table 3. Under current farming conditions in the absence of an interruptible water market, farms would have resource use and net returns Table 4 Other columns of table 4 show the effects of parametric reductions in delivered water on optimal irrigation management for the southeast Idaho rill irrigated farm. Alfalfa is initially allowed 26 inches of consumptive use at an irrigation efficiency of 43%. Alfalfa was a relatively profitable crop, so its optimal water allocation changed only slightly until a 50% reduction in farm water supply was imposed. Then, irrigation efficiency increased to 46%, and consumptive use dropped to 20 acreinches per acre. When farm water delivery was reduced by 63%, the water allocated to alfalfa consumptive use fell to 12 inches, and the irrigation efficiency increased to 58% Because pasture acreage is relatively unprofitable, it fell to the lower-bound constraint in the base run. It was initially allocated 22 inches of consumptive use per acre with an irrigation efficiency of 40%. A 31% supply reduction resulted in a consumptive use de- crease to 10 acre-inches and an increase in irrigation efficiency to 58%, the most restrictive irrigation regimen available to the model under the constraining assumption that the remaining pasture would not be allowed to die. Except for potatoes, crop water use and irrigation efficiency changed as water supplies become more restrictive. Higher irrigation efficiency was obtained by more frequent smaller applications of water requiring higher levels of irrigation labor and management. The other representative farms made similar adjustments to changing water supplies. The farms using sprinklers and pumping energy start with higher base irrigation efficiencies. As water supplies fall they have fewer management alternatives than rill irrigated farms. However, no farm idled cropland until consumptive use was reduced by at least 28%, and then only small amounts of cropland were left idle.
Long-Term Contracts
Interruptible water markets will require longterm contractual commitments of perhaps twenty-five years to produce the greatest hydropower benefits. Because water supplies can range from normal to only half of current consumptive use, market participation would result in an added source of uncertainty for farmers. While interruption probabilities are assumed known, actual water supplies for each year are still uncertain. Parties to a water market would need to develop acceptable definitions of the conditions that trigger interruption. In southern Idaho this would presumably be based on snowpack and reservoir content information. Water supply predictions of increasing certainty might be made in February, March, and April, the latter being the date when an interruption decision must be made so participating farmers would know their water supplies before planting spring crops. Thirty replications of a twenty-five-year simulation serve to illustrate the uncertainty associated with participating in the interruptible water market. Water supply interruptions are based on random draws from the historic river flow record plotted in figure 1. While the expected interruption probability from market participation is a constant 8/51, the actual sequence and degree of interruption vary widely across thirty simulations. Draw 17 had no interruptions in the first twenty-four years. Draw 14 began with four years of normal water supply followed by four out of five years with 35% and 40% supply reductions. Draws 11 and 29 began with 50% supply reductions in the first year. Extreme outcomes will influence the type and amount of compensation that farmers would require to participate in a water market. To recognize the importance of interruption sequence, consider the discounted value of the income streams from each twenty-five-year simulation. Table 5 Table 5 also shows that the present value of net return losses due to water market participation is small for all representative farms. Using a 6% real discount rate, the present values of losses averaged across the simulations range from $27 to $36 per acre. It is these income losses from interruptible water market participation that must be compared to the hydropower benefits of such a market.
Interruptible Market Effects on Water Use and Power Production
Farms with various irrigation systems have different irrigation efficiencies and will respond differently to changes in water delivery. Reducing consumptive use by 25% on southeast Idaho rill irrigated farms requires cutting water deliveries by 50%. Farms with high lift sideroll systems already operate at higher irrigation efficiency; hence, they require only a 29% cut in delivered water to achieve the same 25% consumptive use reduction. Because the link between diversion and consumption use depends on a host of variables such as crop prices, energy and labor costs, and irrigation technology changes, a functioning water market might have to periodically adjust this relationship. Table 6 shows that maximum changes in delivered water required under the market would be as low as 10 acre-inches per acre for the center pivot irrigated farm and as high as 
Methods of Compensation
Under the assumptions of this study, expected hydropower value created by an interruptible water market should far exceed expected costs to agriculture. Thus, it should be possible to more than compensate agriculture for lost farm income and also pay for transaction costs of such a market. However, it is not clear how the differences between agricultural income losses and the value of power created by a water market should be divided among the participants.
Possible compensation methods range from a lump sum payment at time of contract signing to annual payments over the entire contract period, but the preferred mechanism probably depends on the risk preferences of the participants. The utility would agree to long-term interruptible water market contracts if it could sell more firm power while avoiding the risk of having to rely upon an unreliable surplus power market to meet firm load commitments. Irrigators would be encouraged to participate if the compensation increased their expected income and/or reduced income variability. Therefore, the most likely compensation scheme might combine annual payments, to offset average expected loss from market participation, with lump sum payments in years of water supply interruption. In this way both farmers and the utility could increase their incomes and reduce income risk, but neither party would need to fully anticipate the number and severity of interruptions over the entire market period.
A contract length of twenty-five or thirtyfive years would present many uncertainties to all parties. Crop prices, production costs, farming technology, and the value of energy are variables which would affect the value of market participants. Long-term contracts might deal with these factors by indexing payment formulas. The combination of an annuity and pro rata payments in years of interruption could provide maximum flexibility for dealing with these uncertainties.
Another way to compensate irrigators participating in a water market might be lower rates for irrigation pumping power. Lower rates may be justified since nonfirm power will be available for irrigation pumping in good steamflow years, but the participant irrigator would need less power in years of interrupted water supply. To the extent of their market participation, they would become consumers of nonfirm power. An electricity price break would be most significant for farms with high pump lifts. Special provisions would be required for farmers who do not receive power from the owner of the hydroelectric dams.
Conclusions and Cautions
The findings of this study agree with recent literature that the marginal value of water in irrigation is relatively low. One consequence is that some form of interruptible water market aimed at enhanced use of hydroelectric generating capacity is economically attractive. The estimated losses in agriculture are much less than the estimated benefits from additional hydropower generation. Average use of water by agriculture would change very little while creating substantial increases in hydropower value.
Many benefits of an interruptible water market might be secured from a freely functioning annual water market without long-term commitments. However, an annual market might have higher transaction costs including investment in delivery systems and measurement costs of assuring compliance. More important, an annual market could increase participants' income risk. Both factors suggest the value of long-term contracts in an interruptible market.
This research raises a number of related issues and problems. Most western water law, including Idaho's, is based on the appropriation doctrine. Water is appropriated for beneficial use, and rights have priority based on the date of first diversion and use. Present Idaho law provides that water not being beneficially used may be considered as abandoned and subject to appropriation by another user. This makes creation of a water market more difficult. A farmer's willingness to sell or lease water must not be taken as admission that he does not, himself, have a beneficial use for that water. The issue of appurtenance must also be addressed. Recent changes in Idaho water law do allow leasing of water rights to hydropower for one year without abandonment or forfeiture, but more legal changes would be required to implement the market proposed in this article.
A parallel problem is that water rights in many western states including Idaho are defined in terms of diversion quantities rather than the consumptive use that really counts in market transactions. Consumptive water use varies by year and will be difficult to define and qualify in marketable water rights. In fact, water use in Idaho is presently subject to little monitoring or control. Water delivery and consumptive use are rarely measured with precision. The transactions cost of improved water use monitoring and control will consume a portion of the net benefits of any water market.
Given willing water buyers and sellers, the outcome depends on the relative bargaining strength of each market participant and on the nature of the market institutions. Thousands of individual farmers in the upper Snake river are potential water sellers, while there are only one or two major power producers on the Snake-Columbia system who might purchase the water. The disparity of market power means that a free market is unlikely to give either equitable or efficient results. Government probably has a legitimate role in helping to mediate between the many water market sellers and the dominant buyer, looking after the public interest, defining and standardizing contracts terms, and guarding against third party effects. At this point, the equilibrium price and quantity of the market outcome is not predictable.
The present surplus electric generating capacity in the Pacific Northwest limits the value of power from an interruptible water market. As this surplus diminishes in future years, the proposed market should become even more attractive. 
